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DELAYING CHANGE: EXAMINING HOW INDUSTRY
AND MANAGERIAL TURBULENCE IMPACT
STRUCTURAL REALIGNMENT
SAMINA KARIM
Northeastern University
TIMOTHY N. CARROLL
University of South Carolina
CHRIS P. LONG
Georgetown University
This paper examines when firms pursue structural realignment through business
unit reconfiguration, specifically by recombining business units. Our results refine and
extend contingency theory and studies of organization design by drawing on theories of
decision avoidance and delay to describe environmental conditions when firms pursue or
postpone structural realignment. Our empirical analysis of 46 firms from 1978 to 1997,
operating within the U.S. medical device and pharmaceutical sectors, demonstrates that
while decision makers initiate structural recombination during periods of industry growth
(i.e., munificence), they reduce their recombination efforts during periods of industry turbulence (i.e., dynamism), and managerial turbulence (i.e., growth in top management team
size). We also find evidence that firms delay realignment and bide their time for better
environmental conditions of declining turbulence and industry growth before pursuing
more structural realignment. Together, these findings suggest that decision makers often
delay initiating structural recombination until they can effectively process information and
assess how structural changes will help them realign the organization to the environment.

Stalker, 1961; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Thompson, 1967;
Woodward, 1965). The perspective we develop in this
paper builds on the conceptualization of organization
design (i.e., and its redesign) “as something that organizations do, rather than merely as something they
have” (Orton & Weick, 1990: 218; italics added by
authors). Although contingency theory’s expectations
of how to realign (e.g., through structural change) are
generally supported in the literature, our understanding of when firms make these decisions is less
well established. In this paper, we address this issue
by examining a series of factors that influence when
firms choose to initiate and enact structural realignment decisions. We draw upon decision-making
and group dynamics research to inform contingency
theory about expectations relating to the speed of
decision making and consensus-building within executive teams.
We examine this general, theoretical question about
structural realignment by evaluating when and how
firms recombine their business units (Eisenhardt &
Brown, 1999; Karim, 2006). In developing and modifying their organizations’ designs through structural

INTRODUCTION
This paper asks a fundamental question in organization theory—how and when do firms align their
structures with environmental changes? Contingency
theory suggests that firms, when faced with changing
external conditions, should realign to gain fit with their
environment and better capture market opportunities
(Donaldson, 1987; Duncan, 1972; Hofer, 1975). One
mechanism by which to achieve this realignment is
to redesign the structure of the organization (Burns &
We wish to thank seminar participants at Boston University, Ohio State University, Tulane University, the University
of Illinois, University of Minnesota and University of Wisconsin, as well as attendees of the 2010 Strategy Research
Forum, 2009 Organization Science Winter Conference and
Strategic Management Society Conference, and 2008 CORE
Organization Design Workshop for their comments and
suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. We are also
grateful for the constructive feedback from the anonymous
reviewers and our associate editor, Kyle Mayer. We gratefully
acknowledge research assistance by Victoria Lee, ChienChun Liu, and Marketa Sonkova.
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recombination, decision makers attempt to create or
enhance value by reconfiguring their firms’ existing
resources (Karim, 2009; Karim & Kaul, 2015; Karim &
Capron, 2015). A “recombined” unit is any unit that
has experienced a change in boundaries through some
addition or deletion of activities and resources that
have been moved within the firm. We focus on structural recombination in this paper because firms routinely use this mechanism to redistribute resources
inside the organization in order to regain congruence or
alignment with changes in environmental conditions.
Unit boundaries expanding and contracting indicate
a firm’s efforts to reallocate existing resources (Karim,
2012). Thus, examining structural recombination allows us to take a close look at the processes behind
organization design changes.
Because structural recombination can often represent costly and risky initiatives, it is important to
understand what factors influence decision makers
to use this mechanism to achieve realignment with
their environments (Helfat & Karim, 2014). Drawing
on existing contingency theory studies, we expect
that decision makers’ perceptions of environmental
industry growth should increase recombination
initiatives. However, whereas classic contingency
theory suggests that industry turbulence may also
trigger this realignment, we identify information
processing challenges that inhibit executives from
engaging in structural recombination during periods
of environmental industry turbulence (i.e., when
relationships between key performance antecedents
and indicators change very rapidly).
We use research from the decision-making literature (Dobrajska, Billinger, & Karim, 2015) on decision avoidance and delay to explain these dynamics
(Anderson, 2003). Specifically, we argue that because strategic decision makers in turbulent industry
environments are unable to collect and process the
information necessary to assess cause-and-effect
relationships, they cannot develop decision-making
strategies to effectively predict how structural changes
can positively influence firm performance. The resulting difficulties they experience in identifying organizational forms that are appropriate for environmental
contingencies decrease their overall willingness to engage in structural recombination during periods of environmental turbulence (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham,
2009; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005).
Because structural realignment decisions are usually made by the top management team (TMT)
Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001; Helfat & Karim, 2014),
we also examine how factors within these collectives
may foster or inhibit firms’ tendencies to recombine
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business units. We specifically demonstrate how
executive turnover and increases in overall TMT size
decrease the overall level of structural recombination that firms engage. Here, we translate research
on decision delays in groups to theorize how these two
factors limit the capacities of TMTs to build the levels of
consensus and commitment necessary to identify appropriate organizational forms and initiate structural
recombination (Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Bavelas,
1951; Dooley, Fryxell, & Judge, 2000; Eisenhardt, 1990).
By examining the influences of both external industry (i.e., market) turbulence and internal managerial (i.e., within TMTs) turbulence on firms’ tendencies
to initiate structural recombination, our theory refines
arguments put forth by contingency theorists and organization design scholars about how and when firms
align their structures with their environments
(Duncan, 1972; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson,
1967). While general contingency theory suggests that
firms initiate structural realignment to adapt to environmental changes, our research demonstrates that
firms tend to delay the initiation of structural recombination until industry turbulence lessens and decision makers are able to more effectively assess how
these structural changes may benefit the firm (Burns &
Stalker, 1961; Miles & Snow, 1978; Miller, 1988;
Mintzberg, 1979; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). Further,
we find that turbulence in TMTs created by overall size
increases leads to less realignment activity. We suggest
that this happens because executives are less able to
process environmental information and build consensuses around key organizational design decisions
(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Shank, Zeithaml,
Blackburn, & Boyton, 1988; Sutcliffe, 1994).
The empirical setting for this study is the medical
marketplace and includes 28 (4-digit North American
Industry Classification System [NAICS]) market segments within the medical device and pharmaceutical
sectors. We observe 46 firms over the period 1975–1997.
For each firm we track its structural evolution noting
how the firm adds, deletes, and recombines its business
units; we also trace the movement of executives into and
out of a firm’s TMT. To evaluate environmental change,
we examine the growth and turbulence present in the
industries in which these firms are active, as well as
changes in their TMTs.
The paper is organized as follows. It begins by
drawing from literatures on contingency theory, decision making and organization design to develop
several hypotheses about the conditions under which
firms facing turbulence will initiate structural recombination. This is followed by a description of
our methods and measures which outline the data
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and sample, the operationalization of variables, and
the methodology of this study. Finally, the paper concludes with a presentation of results and a discussion
of our findings.
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
Structural Realignment
The question of how best to organize firms has
long held the interest of organization design scholars (Galbraith, 1977; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967;
Thompson, 1967). Because “organizational design is
one of the key levers available for top managers to
affect how decisions are made within organizations”
(Siggelkow, 2011: 1130), a significant amount of
research in organization theory has been dedicated to
understanding how decision makers can navigate
their firms through changing environments to achieve
an optimal organization design. Classic organization
design studies were built on the premise that efforts to
coordinate work (or tasks) should be integrated into
a common structure (or unit) to facilitate information
processing and the effective implementation of strategic initiatives (Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 1973;
Mintzberg, 1979; Tushman & Nadler, 1978).
Contingency theorists interested in organization
design depict the challenge that firms face by describing how they adapt their structures to better align
with changes in external environments (Duncan,
1972; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967).
Classic contingency theory proposes that firms perform better when they align themselves to better fit
key factors in their environments, and that environmental changes should lead firms to initiate structural
changes (Donaldson, 1987; Duncan, 1972; Hofer,
1975). Related studies adopting this perspective
have highlighted how different design characteristics
are more or less appropriate for different strategic
environments (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Miles & Snow,
1978; Miller, 1988; Mintzberg, 1979; Siggelkow &
Rivkin, 2005), either because they allow firms to
better utilize resources (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967;
Thompson, 1967) or process information (Galbraith,
1973; Tushman & Nadler, 1978).
Structural Realignment as Business Unit
Recombination

scholars who have examined how organizations respond to changes in their environments have devoted increasing levels of attention to understanding
how firms use structural recombination to capitalize
on new market opportunities (Karim, 2009; Karim &
Kaul, 2015; Karim & Mitchell, 2004). In contrast to
more traditionally defined restructuring activities
where firms attempt to enter into or exit from markets
by adding (i.e., acquiring) or deleting (i.e., divesting)
business units (Bowman & Singh, 1990; Hoskisson &
Johnson, 1992; Porter, 1987),1 structural recombination
describes initiatives that firms undertake to reorient
how they organize their existing resources and activities (Karim, 2006, 2009).
While comprising one common way that firms
reconfigure themselves to react to their environment
(Karim & Capron, 2015), firms also use structural
recombination to proactively seek opportunities and
realign their structures with environmental demands in ways that allow their business units to
better utilize resources and organize activities
(Karim, 2012; Karim & Williams, 2012). Although
these activities can be disruptive to organizations,
previous research has shown how firms can use
structural recombination as dynamic capabilities to
adapt to their environments and allow them to increase levels of innovation and overall firm performance (Karim, 2009; Karim & Kaul, 2015).
To illustrate how these activities impact firm
evolution, we describe a segment of Johnson and
Johnson’s (J&J’s) history where the firm engaged in
structural realignment activities through a series of
recombinations (Karim & Mitchell, 2004). Figure 1
depicts a sequence of structural recombinations
within (J&J) as it reconfigured its structural organization to respond to market demands over a 20-year
period. Between 1982 and 1989, J&J recombined its
units Applied Fiberoptics and Kees Surgical Specialty with Codman & Shurtleff to bolster its market position in neurostimulators and orthroscopes.
Then, to have greater impact in the general orthopedic market as a whole, in 1993 J&J recombined
Codman & Shurtleff with J&J Orthopedics to form the
division J&J Professional. Through these realignment
activities, J&J succeeded in growing its overall presence and market share in orthopedics.
1

While scholars have made significant progress in
understanding how organizations can achieve an
appropriate fit with their environment, we know
much less about the processes that organizations
take to get there. Over the past decade, however,
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Note that we are not directly examining why firms add
or shed activities since there is an established body of work
on corporate restructuring that already addresses these
issues. We do, however, account for these other forms of
structural change (i.e., adding and shedding) in our study
and explain more about this in our Methods section.
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FIGURE 1
Examples of Business Unit Reconfiguration (including recombination) at J&J, Inc. (modified from Karim, 2009)
by 1975

by 1986

By 1986 recombine
AF into CS.

By 1989 recombine
KSS into CS.

Codman &
Shurtleff, Inc.

Codman &
Shurtleff, Inc.

Internally developed unit (I) Acquired unit (A)

Industry Growth and Structural Realignment
Classic contingency theory proposes one way to
generalize these dynamics by suggesting that firms
that do not align with the demands or volatility of their
industries should alter their structures and attempt to
regain and maintain an effective “fit” with their environment (Donaldson, 1987; Duncan, 1972; Hofer,
1975). Building from this proposition, scholars have
demonstrated that firms facing more dynamic environments are most effective when they enable flexibility and experimentation by using more organic
structures, while firms facing less dynamic environments are more successful when they adopt more
routinized structures that encourage stability and
consistency (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Miller & Friesen,
1984; Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965).
Prior work developed from this perspective describes
how firms use structural recombination to bring resources and activities together in ways that reveal new
synergies and address strategic prospects (Eisenhardt &
Brown, 1999; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996; Galunic &
Rodan, 1998). For example, Galunic and Eisenhardt
(1996) found that firms’ decision makers often used
recombination as a means of moving “charter” (i.e.,
market) responsibilities between business units to
foster a “dynamic realignment” between a firm and its
market opportunities. In addition, Eisenhardt and
Martin (2000), in describing a “patching” process that

By 1993 recombine
CS and J&J
into new J&J Prof.
J&J Professional,
Inc. (created from
recombination 1993)

J&J Orthopedics,
Inc. (internally
developed 1986)

Entry into J&J

by 1993

Kees Surgical
Specialty
(acquired 1987)

Applied
Fiberoptics
(acquired 1982)

Codman &
Shurtleff, Inc.
(acquired pre-1975)

by 1989

Mix of I units

Mix of A units

Mix of A and I units

is similar to structural recombination, observe that firms
will attempt to develop their dynamic capabilities
through “processes that use resources. . .to match and
even create market change” (p. 1107).
Building from these observations, we expect that executives will consider industry growth, labeled “munificence,” as a favorable, but dynamic environmental
condition that encourages them to initiate increased
numbers of structural recombinations. As a common
characteristic highlighted in studies of environmental
change (Dess & Beard, 1984; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008;
Sutcliffe, 1994), munificence represents a strong and
clear indicator of industry growth (Bergh, 1998; Dess &
Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean, 1991) that can serve to
signal that market conditions are abundant with opportunities for firms that adapt and capitalize on them.
Thus, we expect that firms in industries that are growing
will be proactive in using structural recombination to
adapt in ways that enable them to capture potential
economic gains that are present in these markets.
Hypothesis 1. Industry growth experienced by
a firm in its environment has a positive relationship
with the firm’s degree of structural recombination.
Industry Turbulence and Structural Realignment
Having established that firms in munificent environments will tend to recombine their structures
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in ways that allow them to capitalize on perceived
opportunities, we now turn our attention to how
firms experience turbulent environments. While
Hypothesis 1 outlines a positive relationship
between industry growth and structural recombination, the arguments below describe that, while
predictable, the process by which firms engage
in structural recombination is neither linear nor
continuous.
In Hypothesis 2, we predict that firms will less
frequently engage in structural recombination during periods of environmental turbulence (Bourgeois
& Eisenhardt, 1988; Duncan, 1972; Nadkarni & Barr,
2008; Perlow, Okhuysen, & Repenning, 2002). Environmental turbulence describes how rapidly the
links between particular actions and key performance indicators can change (Siggelkow & Rivkin,
2005). This can occur, for example, in environments
where a number of important contingencies evolve
so rapidly that the information decision makers require to formulate strategic decisions is routinely
incomplete or obsolete (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois,
1988).
Our ideas on this build from decision-making
research on avoiding and delaying decisions
(Anderson, 2003). This research suggests that actors
tend to avoid decisions when selecting an appropriate course of action becomes too complicated or
difficult for them (Dhar & Sherman, 1996; Tversky
& Shafir, 1992). These “selection difficulties”
(Anderson, 2003) tend to occur when option sets
change so rapidly that they hamper actors’ capacities to identify appropriate decision-making
strategies and formulate clear preferences. Under
these conditions, decision makers cannot effectively
evaluate the range of potential options that they must
consider in formulating potential solutions to problems (Beattie, Baron, Hershey, & Spranca, 1994; Dhar,
1996, 1997). As a result, they tend to defer decisions,
exhibit omission biases (prefer decisions that do not
require actions), and act to maintain the status quo
(Anderson, 2003).
Prior research on strategic change describes factors in turbulent environments that are consistent
with these dynamics and generate decision avoidance and delays. As Bourgeois and Eisenhardt
(1988) suggest, “Strategic decision making is problematic in this kind of (i.e., turbulent) environment
not only because change is so dramatic, but also
because it is difficult to predict the significance of
a change as it is occurring (Sutton, Eisenhardt, &
Jucker, 1986). As a result, it is particularly easy to
make poor strategic judgments. A traditional way to
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avoid strategic errors is to simply wait to see how
events unfold. . .” (1988: 817).
We anticipate that firms facing such environmental turbulence will respond to the relatively high
level of uncertainty they face either by making only
incremental design changes or by delaying entirely
the initiation of structural recombination to alter
their designs (Nickerson & Zenger, 2002). Several
studies on decision making in turbulent and high
velocity environments propose factors that may
combine to retard or delay the tendencies of key
decision makers to initiate structural recombination
(Davis et al., 2009; Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman &
Dean, 1991). Overall, they suggest that designing
components of organizational structures during periods of environmental turbulence is “an attentionconsuming and mistake-prone process (Hatch, 1998;
Weick, 1998)” (Davis et al., 2009: 414) that requires
time-intensive efforts at sense-making (Weick,
1993). Decision makers in turbulent environments
often find it difficult to identify robust cause-andeffect relationships because critical decision variables are either unreliable or unavailable (Aldrich,
1979; Fredrickson, 1984; Galbraith, 1973; Nutt, 1976;
Thompson, 1967). In addition, even when decision
makers are able to gather and analyze information,
they may often lack the time to identify and process
the sometimes large amounts of information necessary to decide how their firms’ designs should be
altered (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Fredrickson,
1984; Perlow et al., 2002; Quinn, 1980).
Several other studies highlight how these factors
may combine and increase unpredictability to such
a level that firms delay because decision makers are
paralyzed in making structural realignment decisions. Decision makers in these environments can
suffer from “threat-rigidity,” which tends to make
them more risk-averse and contributes to their tendencies to avoid decisions (Bergh, 1998; Keats & Hitt,
1988; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Under these conditions, both their willingness and their ability to
process non-routine information will significantly
decrease (Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001;
Gilbert, 2005; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). As
a result, executives will tend to process information
using familiar perspectives, rely more on authority
and control mechanisms to reinforce existing structures, and experiment less with changing their organization’s design through structural recombination
(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Bourgeois, McAllister, &
Mitchell, 1978; Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Gladstein &
Reilly, 1985; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Thomas,
Clark, & Gioia, 1993).
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Scholars who acknowledge the information
processing challenges present in turbulent (i.e.,
high “dynamism”2) environments have observed
that these factors can specifically hinder the
capacity of decision makers to develop timely
changes to the overall design of their firms (Davis
et al., 2009; Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean,
1991).3 For example, Davis and colleagues (2009)
who examine the influence of environmental
changes on organizational structures conclude
that optimal “amounts” of organizational structure
decrease as environments become less predictable.
Under these conditions, environmental turbulence compromises decision makers’ capacities
to identify the factor patterns that are critical to
determining which structural recombinations may
be most effective within a particular strategic
environment.
Building on this discussion, our second hypothesis describes how environmental industry
turbulence can decrease a firm’s tendency to engage in structural recombination. Because these
activities may be disruptive (Karim, 2009; Karim &
Kaul, 2015), we expect that firms facing increased
turbulence may be less likely to try these organization design initiatives. 4 Thus, as decision
makers facing turbulent environments question
2

Please see Sharfman and Dean (1991) for an overview
of classifications of organizations’ environments.
3
Based on prior research, we assume that decision
makers are aware of their external environment (Daft,
Sormunen, & Parks, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Garg et al.,
2003; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), thus deterrence is not due to
lack of awareness.
4
Also noteworthy is empirical evidence that demonstrates how delays in organizational design decisions can
result in relatively higher levels of firm performance. For
example, in a simulation of structural change and performance, Nickerson and Zenger (2002) found that higher
levels of inertia could result in higher levels of performance when that inertia prevented managers from making
premature changes to their structures. In addition, Rivkin
and Siggelkow (2003) who model the interdependence
of elements of organization design (including design of
hierarchy, divisionalization, and limits on the ability of
managers to process information), observe that while
higher performing firms actively search for good strategic
solutions, they do not prematurely implement their decisions. Consistent with these observations, Davis and
colleagues (2009) surmise that “. . .adding structure is ineffective in [a turbulent] environment because there is little
predictable pattern in the flow of opportunities that managers can use to adjust their organizational structures to the
environment” (Davis et al., 2009: 436).
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whether realignment via structural recombination
will produce long-lasting, positive effects on firm
performance, we expect that they will be less
likely to initiate these types of structural changes.
Hypothesis 2. Industry turbulence experienced
by a firm in its environment has a negative relationship with the firm’s degree of structural
recombination.
Drawing further on contingency arguments that
firms benefit by evolving with their environments,
we also argue that firms will engage in higher levels
of structural recombination once the level of environmental turbulence they face begins to lessen
(Bourgeois et al., 1978: 508; Davis et al., 2009;
Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). As the volatility of
markets lessens, the information collected by decision makers becomes more consistent and stable,
allowing for faster information processing and
decision making (Galbraith, 1973, 1977). Under
these conditions, decision makers increase their
relative capacity to analyze the strategic environment and gain greater confidence in their analysis
of their organizational structure. With this confidence, decision makers will gain a greater capacity
to develop decision strategies and a willingness to
evaluate decision options. These developments
will decrease the perceived value of maintaining
the status quo and increase the perceived connections that decision makers see between structural
realignments and firm performance gains. Because
these actors will be more inclined to believe that
structural realignment will have a longer-term,
positive impact on firm performance, they will be
more willing to initiate structural change through
recombination. Stated differently, in some contrast
to Hypothesis 2 where we argue that the absolute
level of market turbulence will negatively impact
structural recombination, we also expect (in Hypothesis 3a) that a rate of decline in this turbulence
will positively impact structural recombination
initiatives.
Even in situations where environmental turbulence is relatively high, a reduction in turbulence
represents a positive signal about the future predictability of one’s environment (Nadkarni & Barr,
2008; Sutcliffe, 1994). Thus, in addition to expecting that reductions in turbulence will be associated
with increased structural recombination, we anticipate that these reductions will also dampen the
negative relationship between the absolute levels of
industry turbulence that firms encounter and their
tendencies to engage in structural recombination.
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Hypothesis 3a. Reductions in industry turbulence experienced by a firm in its environment
have a positive relationship with the firm’s degree of structural recombination.
Hypothesis 3b. Reductions in industry turbulence experienced by a firm in its environment
will dampen the negative relationship between
industry turbulence and the firm’s degree of
structural recombination.
In addition to explicit reductions in industry turbulence, we also expect that executives will consider
industry growth (i.e., munificence) as a favorable
signal of environmental conditions. Thus, we expect
that for conditions of both high industry turbulence
and high industry growth, munificence will dampen
the negative relationship between industry turbulence and structural recombination. The primary
reason for this is that executives in growing industries will perceive environmental turbulence as
relatively less threatening when compared to executives in firms that face stagnant or shrinking demand. They will, thus, be more motivated to develop
and implement decision strategies that enable them
to evaluate options around initiating structural realignments (Dhar, 1996, 1997).
As a common characteristic highlighted in studies of
environmental change (Dess & Beard, 1984; Nadkarni
& Barr, 2008; Sutcliffe, 1994), munificence represents
a strong and clear indicator of industry growth (Bergh,
1998; Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean, 1991) that
can serve to signal that market conditions are abundant
with favorable opportunities. As we argued earlier in
advance of Hypothesis 1, munificence signals to decision makers that they are not in “danger” (Bourgeois
et al., 1978), and that opportunities to capture additional market share are available. Even if the overall
level of turbulence that firms experience is high, we
expect that firms will react positively to conditions of
industry growth and be relatively more proactive in
realigning their structures to capture these opportunities for economic gains.
Hypothesis 4. Industry growth experienced by
a firm in its environment will dampen the negative
relationship between industry turbulence and the
firm’s degree of structural recombination.
Managerial Turbulence and Structural
Realignment
While our discussion so far highlights the environmental conditions external to the firm that may
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hinder that ability and willingness of decision
makers to pursue structural recombination, it is also
logical to conclude that turbulence within the firm
may also delay these realignment processes. Below,
we build on decision avoidance and group dynamics research to specifically describe how changes in
TMT size and composition may lead firms to delay
the initiation of their structural recombination
efforts.
We focus on these issues because research highlights how the interests and perceptions of executives directly influence how a firm directs its
attention, conducts searches, evaluates problems,
and generates solutions (Child, 1972; Cyert & March,
1963; Hambrick, 1994; Hambrick & Mason, 1984;
March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997). As previous
studies of organization design have shown, executives play a critical role in reshaping organizations to create better alignment with their
environments (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Galunic
& Eisenhardt, 1996; Nadler & Tushman, 1997). For
example, Galunic and Eisenhardt comment that
“. . .because executives are more likely than others
to have broad architectural knowledge of their
firm and are arguably the only ones with the formal
power and clout to effect such changes, their involvement is key” (2001: 1246). Child (1972) also
stressed the role of executives in formulating and
implementing strategic choices by identifying
them as key mediators between structural alignment decisions and environmental conditions
(such as the allocation of resources or whether to
split the firm into smaller units).
Bourgeois and Eisenhardt note that while “decisions should be a product of management team involvement and consensus (Bavelas, 1951; Bourgeois,
1980; Leavitt, 1951). . .particularly under conditions of
high uncertainty” (1988: 818), it takes time to generate
the consensus necessary to initiate these structural
changes. Several computational studies evaluating
group decision making have shown how personnel
changes within decision making groups can affect the
breadth of the search and solution alternatives that
groups consider (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005) and the
overall number of strategic initiatives pursued by the
firm (Csaszar, 2012). Because firms tend to value efforts to generate consensus among members of the
TMT (Dooley et al., 2000), we expect that turbulence
in the form of executive turnover and growth of the
TMT will delay the extent to which they will realign
their structures with environmental contingencies
and reduce the overall degree to which firm will engage in structural recombination.
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Managerial turbulence as TMT turnover. “One
of the most frequently occurring but daunting challenges for teams is personnel turnover” (Thompson,
2004: 96). As members enter and exit the TMT, both the
expertise and the interpersonal dynamics of the
group change (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Because
the process of formulating and implementing
structural recombination comprises a complex set
of tasks that occurs between often highly interdependent individuals, the entry and exit of TMT
members often significantly compromises the overall
capacity and speed with which these teams process
information relevant to the initiation of structural recombination (Argote, Insko, Yovetich, & Romero,
1995; Briggs & Naylor, 1965).
Changing preferences that are introduced by the loss
or gain of members force TMTs to engage in the often
time-consuming activity of reformulating decision
strategies. This can increase the perceived difficulty
of selecting appropriate responses to environmental
contingencies which can lead TMT members to delay
the initiation of structural changes in favor of upholding the status quo (Anderson, 2003). Under these conditions, TMTs find it more difficult to generate the
robust levels of consensus and commitment that are
necessary to initiate and effectively implement structural recombination (Dooley et al., 2000).
Hypothesis 5a. Managerial turbulence—in the
form of TMT turnover—has a negative relationship with the firm’s degree of structural
recombination.
Managerial turbulence as TMT growth. Hambrick
and D’Aveni (1992: 1449) also argue that TMT size is an
important consideration because “at a basic level, the
resources available to a team result from how many
people are on it.” As TMT size increases, the growing
numbers of members tend to generate and actively
consider a larger number and a more diverse set of issues
(Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Weick, 1987). While important
for fostering creativity and decision comprehensiveness
(Weick, 1987), larger TMTs tend to generate greater
numbers of opinions and perspectives (Dearborn &
Simon, 1958) on key strategic issues which retards the
capacity of these collectives to build consensuses
around potential sets of structural solutions (Hambrick,
Cho, & Chen, 1996; Shank et al., 1988; Sutcliffe, 1994).
As numbers of members increase, the capacity of the
TMT to resolve issues around key points of contention
also tends to decrease. Through often prolonged debates over issues, larger TMTs tend to generate higher
levels of cognitive and affective conflicts that further
erode their capacity to agree on appropriate responses
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to environmental contingencies (Amason & Sapienza,
1997; Eisenhardt, 1999; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven,
1990). In addition, the negative effect produced by
these conflicts can significantly increase the perceived
risks of proposed structural changes to the status quo
which will augment the perceived value of inaction
and further delay the initiation of structural recombination (Anderson, 2003).
Hypothesis 5b. Managerial turbulence—in the
form of executive TMT growth—has a negative
relationship with the firm’s degree of structural
recombination.
In summary, although contingency theory proposes
that firms will realign to match their changing environments, a theory of group dynamics on decision
making supports the idea that this realignment may be
deterred or postponed until more opportune times.
When observing industry turbulence, we argue that
efforts to pursue structural realignment may occur
when there are reductions in turbulence or when firms
experience industry growth. Further, we highlight that
turbulence among decision makers may also delay
how rapidly firms align to their environments and
hypothesize that executive turnover and growth of top
management team size will inhibit building consensus
around decision making and deter the extent to which
firms engage in structural recombination activities.
The hypotheses we present that describe these relationships are summarized in Figure 2.
METHODS AND MEASURES
Data and Sample
Studying structural recombination and its relationship with turbulence requires a longitudinal sample
(Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 1974). We gathered data from
several editions of the Medical & healthcare marketplace guide, namely those published in 1978, 1983,
1986, 1989, 1993, and 1997.5 The guides include information concerning U.S. and non-U.S. firms operating in the U.S. medical marketplace. For each firm, the
“The medical & healthcare marketplace guide” was
published by International Bio-Medical Information Services, Inc. (Acton, MA, and Miami, FL; ed. Adeline B. Hale
and Arthur B. Hale) in 1975, 1978, 1983, 1986, and 1989.
Subsequent editions have been published by MLR Publishing Company (Philadelphia, PA) and by Dorland’s
Biomedical Publications (Philadelphia, PA). We froze our
data collection at 1997 since afterward the recombination
data are no longer as detailed and eventually stop completely (by early 2000s).
5
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FIGURE 2
Firm Realignment through Structural Recombination
Industry Growth (p-1)
Munificence (in sales)

H1 (+)

H4 (+)
Industry Turbulence (p-1)
Dynamism (in sales)

Firm’s Degree of
Structural
Recombination (p)

H2 (–)
H3b (–)

H3a (+)

Reduction in Industry Turbulence (p-2 to p-1)

Managerial Turbulence (p-1)
TMT turnover
Increase in TMT size

guide denotes the business units that exist each year. A
business unit is a structural component whose identity
is recognized by the firm with a unique address and
some responsibility for one or several product markets. The guide includes descriptions and histories of
firms and their units. At the unit-level, there is information concerning the unit’s product market activities,
executives, location, origin (i.e., internally developed
or acquired), and any recombination experienced by
a unit. The firm-level information includes descriptions of unit divestitures, key personnel, key financials,
nationality, date of incorporation, public or private
status, as well as other characteristics.
The sample for this study is 46 firms of a mixed
variety. To avoid sample bias, we initially began with
250 firms which exist in the 1978 panel, starting with
letters A, B, and C.6 These initial 250 firms were
comprised of medical device, pharmaceutical, and
healthcare service firms. This sample was reduced to
212 firms as we chose to focus on product firms
only,7 excluding the healthcare service firms. Next,
6
Randomly selecting 250 firms from the 1978 guide was
considered to be as random as starting from the beginning
of the alphabet. The only noticeable yet negligible bias of
sampling from the beginning of the alphabet is that there
are a greater number of domestic firms (27 firms starting
with the term “American”) and firms practicing in the
medical device category (23 firms starting with the term
“Bio” of which 19 were medical device firms, and ten firms
starting with the term “Cardiac” of which nine were medical device firms). We do not have any reason to believe
that the name of a firm should bias our results in any way.
7
The guides had far more granular levels of categorization for product firms than for service firms.

H5a & H5b (–)

because STATA requires at least two observations
for fixed-effects models and the models include
lagged terms (explained further in the Methodology
section), this reduced the sample further to 111
firms.8 To study our dependent variable (i.e., degree
of structural recombination), we were only interested in firms with multiple units. This further
reduced our sample to 48 firms. Of these 48 firms, ten
firms did not survive to the end of the study period
(1997) (i.e., eight were acquired and two dissolved).
To avoid any bias from failure, we excluded the two
failed firms from the study. However, because we do
not view acquisitions as firm failures (Graebner &
Eisenhardt, 2004), we included the eight firms that
were acquired over the entire period studied. Thus,
our final sample consists of 171 firm-period observations from 46 firms.
While this sample size may seem small for scholars that are used to working with a large “n,” it is
relatively large and unique for the granular study of
structural change. Current studies in this area have
utilized either simulation models or case-based examinations representing at most a handful of firms.
In contrast, our sample includes several dozen firms,
8

A minimum of two observations and lagged independent variables meant that we had to shrink our
sample to the 111 firms that remained in 1989 of the 250
that we began with in 1978. For these firms, we were able to
capture a first observation of reconfiguration between
1986–1989 with lagged independent variables between
1983–1986, and a second observation of reconfiguration
between 1983–1986 with lagged independent variables
between 1978–1983. If these firms survived beyond 1989,
then we had more than two observations.
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which allows us to attribute a relatively high level of
generalizability for our findings. The descriptive
statistics (see Table 1) of this sample support claims
of its diversity; of the 46 firms, about half are diversified outside of the medical sector (21), about
a third are private (17), and about a quarter have
foreign parents (13), are not acquisition-active (14),
and are active in pharmaceuticals (14) (versus medical devices). Lastly, we collected external, industry
data on the 28 market segments (based on 4-digit
NAICS codes) in which the 46 firms were active from
Compustat (1973–1997 yearly)9—we describe these
data more in the section on explanatory variables.
Variables and Operationalization
Dependent variable. The dependent variable for
our hypotheses is “degree of recombination”
within a period. This is a count variable of the
number of unit boundary changes (i.e., expansion
or contraction from moved resources and activities) that occur in a firm within a time period. If two
units were combined then both had been structurally altered and this was counted as two recombination events. If product market activities
were moved out of a unit and moved to another
unit, this also was counted as two recombination
events since the boundary of the initial unit became smaller and the other unit became larger.
This exemplifies that in our setting it is appropriate
to study both expansion and contraction of business units since both are indicative of the firm
attempting to reallocate resources within the firm
of the resources already at hand (Karim, 2012). A
simple view of our operationalization is to imagine
that all of the units of a firm were charted over the
period of the study with arrows indicating when
a unit boundary changed, and that the degree of
recombination is the count of these arrows within
a particular period. As an example, in Figure 1, for
the period 1983–1986 we would calculate that
there are two recombination events: (1) the
boundary of Applied Fiberoptics changed as its
unit was merged into Codman and Shurtleff, Inc,
and (2) the boundary of Codman and Shurtleff, Inc
also changed and grew to encompass the resources
9

We also collected industry data from the U.S. Bureau of
the Census (1972–1996 in five year intervals), however
because the periods did not match exactly with our
reconfiguration periods, we present analysis in this paper
of the more accurately matched data collected from
Compustat.
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and activities of Applied Fiberoptics. Given that
we have six panels of data, we observe five periods
in our study: 1978–1983, 1983–1986, 1986–1989,
1989–1993, and 1993–1997.
Unit acquisitions and divestitures (during period
“p”), which are choices made by firms to obtain new or
discard existing resources and activities, were not
considered recombination events in this study, as we
are only interested in the redesign (i.e., redeployment,
reallocation, redistribution) within the firm of what the
firm already has to work with and continues to work
with as it realigns. However, if a target that was acquired in period “p” is recombined into another unit in
the future (e.g., during time period “p11”), this would
be considered a recombination event in that future
period (e.g., during time period “p11”) since the target
belonged to the firm for some period of time. Thus, the
study acknowledges and tracks the eventual recombination of acquired units. In the example given in
Figure 1, when Applied Fiberoptics was acquired by
J&J in 1982, this event was not considered a recombination event when calculating our dependent
variable for the period 1978–1983. However, this acquired unit was later combined with the Codman and
Shurtleff unit by 1986, thus, this recombination was
counted as an event when calculating our dependent
variable for the period 1983–1986.
Explanatory variables. For Hypotheses 1, 2, and
4, our measures of external, industry growth and
turbulence are drawn from Dess and Beard’s (1984)
commonly cited operationalization of industry “munificence” and “dynamism,” respectively. Dynamism
has been commonly referred to as industry instability,
unpredictability, or turbulence (Sharfman & Dean,
1991; Wholey & Brittain, 1989). We chose to use these
operationalizations since they are widely used by
scholars (Garg, Walters, & Priem, 2003; Nadkarni &
Barr, 2008; Sutcliffe, 1994) and we wanted to remain
consistent with past studies on structural change
(e.g., restructuring) (Bergh, 1998; Keats & Hitt, 1988).
These constructs were originally comprised by Dess
and Beard from Census data using four industry variables (namely industry sales, margin, value added,
and total employment) and captured changes within
industries (based on Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] codes)(Dess & Beard, 1984). Taking fiveyear Census data, they regressed each variable against
time (the past five years) to determine the slope of the
relationship:
yt 5 b0 1 b1 t 1 at

(1)

Munificence (i.e., growth) is the time coefficient estimate (b1 ) (i.e., regression slope) from Equation 1
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divided by the variable’s mean value (Bergh, 1998).
Dynamism (i.e., turbulence) is the standard error of
the time coefficient (b1 ) divided by the variable’s
mean value. For Dess and Beard (1984), who used
four Census variables to construct their measure,
the munificence (or dynamism) construct was the
sum of these four variables’ munificence (or turbulence) measures. Because the Census data periods
(1977–1982–1987–1992–1997) with five-year gaps
do not often match scholars’ study periods, it is
common for scholars to use only industry sales—a
measure that can be observed outside of Census
data—instead of a four variable sum (Garg et al., 2003;
Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Sutcliffe, 1994). Similarly, we
collected data on munificence and dynamism in industry sales from Compustat to match our study periods (i.e., 1978–1983–1986–1989–1993–1997).
After the munificence and dynamism measures
were calculated for each of the 28 market segments
(based on 4-digit NAICS codes) in our sample for the
periods of our study, we then created a weighted
munificence and weighted dynamism measure for
each firm per period that averaged the munificence
(or dynamism) felt by the firm in all of its markets
(i.e., representing all of the 4-digit markets a firm is
active in within that period). If a firm was only active
in one market during period “p”, then its level of
industry growth (or turbulence) for that period “p”
was simply the munificence (or dynamism) of that
market for period “p”. If a firm was active in five
markets in period “p”, we averaged the growth (or
turbulence) of all five markets during that period. See
Table 2 for an example of the dynamism calculations
for external, industry turbulence experienced by
a firm. We construct a “weighted” average of both
industry growth and turbulence per firm per period.
Recall that the guides are extremely granular in listing the product markets of firms; this allows us to
also be more precise in creating overall industry
growth and turbulence measures for a firm for any
period “p”. It may be the case that a firm is active in
five product markets (as listed by the guides; see
Table 2, the fifth column that depicts “1978–1983
Dynamism”) two of which happen to fall under the
same NAICS 4-digit market segment. In such an instance, as depicted in Table 2, we would include that
4-digit market turbulence (or munificence) measure
twice in our average in order to properly represent
that the firm is more involved in that 4-digit market
sector. In our example in Table 2, the firm’s total
level of industry turbulence for 1978–1983 is the
average of five product markets’ turbulence levels;
notice that both “Diagnostic Test Kits” and “Surgical
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Instruments” fall under the 4-digit NAICS market
segment 3391 of “instruments and apparatus” so this
market segment’s dynamism (calculated as 0.0134) is
counted twice in the industry turbulence average
that is calculated for the firm. Since we do not have
data on firms’ revenue per product market, this
weighting is an attempt to signify the salience of each
market’s turbulence (or growth) to the firm.
For Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we operationalized the
change in industry turbulence as the “amount dynamism reduction”. This was calculated as the difference
between dynamism in an earlier period and dynamism
in a latter period (e.g., amount dynamism reduction
(p) 5 dynamism(p-1) – dynamism(p)). Note that if
dynamism reduction is positive this means that dynamism is declining (i.e., it was higher before and is
less now). If the reduction value is negative, it means
that dynamism is not declining but actually increasing
(i.e., it was less before and is higher now). Recall, that
we expect that as the amount of “dynamism reduction”
increases, this signals diminishing turbulence and we
expect decision makers to initiate greater amounts of
structural realignment through recombination.
For Hypotheses 5a and 5b, we examine management
as corporate executives at headquarters (HQ). Note that
the number of executives at HQ represents corporate
team size. Following Romanelli and Tushman (1994)
who operationalized changes in power distribution
within organization design as executive turnover, we
represent management turbulence by calculating two
variables that signify turnover. Corporate executive
turnover at period “p” is labeled “Actual HQ turnover”
and is the count of the number of executives who were
added to and removed from the TMT from period “p-1”
to “p”. “Amount increase in corporate team size” is the
change in the total number of corporate executives in
headquarters from period “p-1” to “p” where a positive
value indicates an increase in the team size by that
amount, and a negative value indicates a decrease in
the team size by that amount.
Control variables. There are several other firm,
industry, and time-level controls included in the study.
We acknowledge that decision makers may want to
initiate structural change but be unable to due to inertial constraints. Thus, for our firm-level controls, we
control for this by including size and age of firms in our
models. Firm-level controls10 include “log of medical
sales” (to proxy size), “percent medical sales” (to
evaluate diversified firms), and “log of age”. We expect
We had to exclude “number of employees” to avoid
multicollinearity with other variables; it was highly correlated with medical sales and age.
10
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TABLE 1
Sample Firms’ Descriptive Statistics
Summary of 46 firms:
Survive to 1997?
Public?
Foreign?
Industry?
Acquisition-active?
Diversified?

38 survive
29 public
13 foreign parents
32 medical devices
32 acquisition-active
21 diversified

8 acquired
17 private
33 U.S. parent/firm
14 pharmaceuticals
14 no acquisition activity
25 only medical

Summary of variables in analyses from 46 firms:
Degree of recombination (p)
Log medical sales (p-1)
Percent medical sales (p-1)
Log firm age (p-1)
Percent turnover of product markets (p-1)
Percent of acquired units (p-1)
Percent increase in total units (p-1)
Percent increase in total sales (p-1)
Actual HQ turnover (p-1)
Amount increase in corp team size (p-1)
Industry munificence (p-1)
Industry dynamism logged (p-1)
Amount dynamism reduction (p-1)
Dummy dynamism reduction (p-1)
Acquisition activity in industry (p-1)
Change in rivalry in industry (p-1)

OBS
171
171
171
171
171
171
171
171
170
170
171
171
171
171
171
171

that firms that are more focused on the medical sector
may find more opportunities for recombination due
to their specialization and knowledge of the markets. Older firms, though they may have more resources at their disposal to pursue change, often
suffer from inertial constraints deterring structural
change (Nickerson & Zenger, 2002).
Complementing Hypothesis 5a and 5b, scholars have
identified several other internal core elements (along
with management) that, when turbulent, may be associated with structural realignment (Nadler & Tushman,
1997; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985). There is consensus within organization design literature that organizational effectiveness is enhanced when an organization’s design not
only matches its external environment, but also when
the firm maintains a fit, congruence, or alignment between its external environment and its internal elements (Burton, Lauridsen, & Obel, 2002; Miller &
Friesen, 1984; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). These
internal elements include power and people distribution (i.e., what we proxy as management), a firm’s
market strategies, control systems and work coordination, performance and growth, and a firm’s culture
(Nadler & Tushman, 1997; Tushman & Romanelli,
1985). Nadler and Tushman highlight how disruptions

MEAN
3.02
5.00
0.69
1.72
0.58
0.30
0.15
1.04
0.92
0.09
0.11
21.67
20.00
0.45
77.20
59.42

SD
5.99
1.06
0.36
0.31
0.92
0.29
0.50
4.38
1.65
1.67
0.09
0.32
0.04
0.50
66.22
141.13

MIN
0
3.00
0.00
0.90
0
0
20.67
20.87
0
213
20.12
22.32
20.15
0
2.00
2100

MAX
46
6.96
1.00
2.20
6
0.88
3.00
44.50
13
6
0.32
20.70
0.19
1
342.67
516.60

in these internal elements represent “several situations
that typically justify a major redesign” (1997: 49), thus
we control for turbulence in these areas.11
Market strategies are represented by both the
number of product markets in which a firm is active,
as well as how acquisition active a firm is during
a period “p” (Karim & Mitchell, 2000). For turbulence
in market activities, we operationalize “percent
turnover of product markets” as the percent change in
the total number of product markets the firm is active
in during period “p” as compared to “p-1”. To capture
turbulence from relative acquisition activity, we include “percent of acquired units” during a period “p”
to signify level of acquisition activity as compared to
internal development. Work coordination is represented by the number of total units operated by the
firm during a period “p” (Mintzberg, 1979); turbulence in work coordination is calculated as the “percent increase in total units” operated by the firm from
period “p-1” to “p” (and may be positive indicating an
increase or negative indicating a decrease). Finally,
performance is characterized by a firm’s total sales for
11

We were unable to identify an indicator of culture in
our data source so we cannot include cultural disruption as
a control.

2016

Karim, Carroll, and Long

803

TABLE 2
Example of Calculations for Industry Dynamisma
Product Market
(in Guides)

4-digit NAICS
Industry

4-digit NAICS
Industry

Biochemicals
Biologicals
Diagnostic Test Kits

Chemicals
3259
Biological products
3254
Surgical, medical,
3391
laboratory
instruments and
apparatus
Separation Equipment
Electromedical
3345
equipment
Surgical Instruments
Surgical, medical,
3391
laboratory
instruments and
apparatus
Firm’s Level of Industry Dynamism (weighted average)

1973–1978
Dynamism

1978–1983
Dynamism

1983–1986
Dynamism

1986–1989
Dynamism

1989–1993
Dynamism

0.0163
0.0039
0.0107

0.0268
0.0085
0.0134

0.0541
0.0048
0.0864

0.0211
0.0045
0.0254

0.0180
0.0056
0.0103

0.0129

0.0324

0.0059

0.0132

0.0079

0.0134

0.0864

0.0254

0.01890

0.04752

0.01792

0.01095

0.01045

a

for Accurate Chemical and Scientific Corp.
Note: Dynamism in Market 3259 (for 1978) 5 0.0163 5 Std:Err:ðB1 Þ where “B1 ” is the estimated coefficient from the regression model
IndustrySales
yt 5 b0 1 b1 t 1 at in which “y” represents Industry Sales, and “t” represents time from 1973–1977. (Bergh, 1998; Dess & Beard, 1984; Garg et al.,
2003; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Sharfman & Dean, 1991; Sutcliffe, 1994; Wholey & Brittain, 1989)
Firm’s Level of Industry Dynamism (for 1978) 5 Markets’Dynamism 5 average(0.0163, 0.0039, 0.0107, 0.0129) 5 0.01095
Firm’s Level of Industry Dynamism (for 1983) 5 Markets’Dynamism 5 average(0.0268, 0.0085, 0.0134, 0.0324, 0.0134) 5 0.01890

a period “p”, and thus performance turbulence is
calculated as the “percent increase in total sales” for
a period “p” compared to “p-1” reflecting relative
performance change at the firm (and may be positive
indicating an increase or negative indicating a decrease).12 Lastly, all models include panel period
dummies (with the period 1993–1997 omitted) to
control for any time-sensitive heterogeneity that may
have occurred during our study period.
12

Note that this variable denotes both increase or decrease (as in positive or negative values) as well as magnitude (in the percentage amount change from a former
period to a latter period). For example, if a firm’s sales
change from $100 million to $200 million between two
periods, it will have a percent change of 1100%. If the sales
change from $100 million to $150 million, it will have
a percent change of 150%. Alternatively, if the sales go
from $100 million to $50 million, it will have a percent
change of 250%. We expect, based on performance expectations and problemistic search, that decision makers
facing declining percent changes in performance will initiate more structural realignment. Thus, to state the inverse, as this variable (the percent value) increases
reflecting that performance change is positive, we expect
firms to recombine less. In our examples given here, when
the firm has 250% increase it would be expected to pursue
more recombination then when it has 150% increase, and
similarly the firm with 150% increase would be expected
to pursue more recombination than when it has 1100%
increase in sales.

Methodology
Our hypotheses predict that both industry characteristics (of growth and turbulence) and managerial turbulence will be associated with the firm’s
degree of structural recombination. Because this
dependent variable is a non-negative count variable
of recombination events during a period “p”, a linear
model’s assumptions of homoskedasticity (where
variance of the residuals is constant) and normally
distributed errors are violated producing inconsistent, inefficient, and biased coefficient estimates. In such cases, one should use either a negative
binomial or Poisson model (Long, 1997). Recent
econometric advances advocate using quasi maximum likelihood fixed-effects Poisson models to
control for unobserved firm heterogeneity and because it provides consistent estimates (compared to
the negative binomial) under general conditions
(Rysman & Simcoe, 2008; Wooldridge, 1999). Further, we run Poisson models that apply robust standard errors to our estimates using the STATA
command “xtpqml”,13 as well as models that do not
13

For fixed-effects models, STATA requires a minimum
of two observations per group (i.e., firm) and dropped
groups with zero reconfigurations across all time periods.
The command “xtpqml” produces estimates that are robust
to “both heteroskedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation
in the dependent variable” (Rysman & Simcoe, 2008: 22).
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apply robust standard errors to compare our results
with prior research. Note that when applying robust
standard errors the standard for finding significance
in our coefficient estimates is much more stringent
than past literature that has typically used traditional
Poisson models without robust standard errors.
To minimize issues of endogeneity (and in particular reverse causality), we model the effect that
turbulence has on future recombination, and thus
use lagged values of our explanatory variables as
regressors in the estimated equation (see Equation
2) (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Judge, Hill, Griffiths,
Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1988). This technique is appropriate for panel data. In this study, a group is a firm
(j), “X” represents control variables, and our lagged
explanatory variables are noted. Thus, at the level
of analysis of firm-year observations, one of our
models resembles:
Recombinationj,p 5 expðb0 1 b1 Munificencej,p1
1 b2 Dynamismj,p1 1 b3 Amt_Dyn_Reductionj,p1
1 b4 ðAmt_Dyn_Reductionj,p1 *Dynamismj,p1 Þ
1 b5 Management_Turbj,p1 1 ::: 1 bn Xj,p1 Þ
(2)
Thus, recombination at firm “j” during period “p” is
evaluated as a function of growth and turbulence during
period “p-1”, and controls for period “p-1”. Recall that
the study is comprised of six panels (1978, 1983, 1986,
1989, 1993 and 1997) of firm-level data from the guides,
with a total of five periods of data observed (1978–1983,
1983–1986, 1986–1989, 1989–1993, 1993–1997). For
any explanatory variables that are not captured over
a duration of time (period “p-1”), we measure the variable at the end of period “p-1”; for example, when we
observe a firm’s market entry and exit over the period
1989–1993, the variable is measured over the period
1986–1989 but some control variables such as age are
captured at the end of that time period at 1989. Because
we include a period lag there are at most four observations per firm (j).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We test the relationship of internal and external
turbulence on structural recombination. Table 3 shows
the correlations between our measures. A glance at
the correlation matrix of the turbulence variables
(Table 3) highlights that turnover of corporate executives (corr 5 0.644) is positively correlated with recombination, which provides a preliminary indication
that Hypothesis 5a may not be supported. The high
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correlation between medical sales and age (corr 5
0.533) indicates that, in our sample, older firms generally earn greater revenue than younger firms. Further,
growing industries are associated with less industry
turbulence (corr 5 –0.508). Since several of our correlations are high, we also test for multicollinearity and
find that our data meet the standard criteria required
indicating the multicollinearity does not unduly affect
the relationships we observe.14
In Table 4,15 we show our analysis of how industry
growth and turbulence, as well as managerial turbulence, may influence a firm’s choice to pursue structural
recombination. Model 1 includes only control variables.
In Model 2 we add the variable for managerial turbulence. Finally, in Model 3 we add the industry measures
of munificence (growth) and dynamism (turbulence).
Model 3 may be considered the full model before testing
further moderating effects and robustness checks. In
Table 4 we show the regression estimates for the Poisson
models as well as those that apply more stringent robust
standard errors. In latter tables we sometimes show results only with robust standard errors if coefficient estimates of interest are significant. If only a Poisson
model is shown and a model with robust standard errors
is not shown, it means that the coefficient estimates of
interest were not significant in the robust case but were
only for the regular Poisson. For brevity we have excluded them from some tables.
Industry Conditions and Structural Realignment
The results in Table 4 Model 3 show support for
Hypothesis 1 which predicts that industry growth will
be positively related to a firm’s degree of structural
recombination; the coefficient estimate on “munificence” is significant for the Poisson model and it still
has weak significance when applying robust standard
errors. Model 3 also provides strong support for
Hypothesis 2, which predicts that industry-level,
14

We test for multicollinearity (where correlated predictors may inflate standard errors) by calculating variance
inflation factors (VIFs) and condition indices for predictors
of each model. None of the individual VIFs exceed the
accepted threshold of 10 (they are all under 2 in our
models), and no condition index exceeds 30; Belsley, Kuh,
and Welsch (1980) suggest that higher metrics indicate
collinearity problems. Our Model 3 has a condition number (highest condition index) of 26.80 and a mean VIF of
1.41, indicating that multicollinearity is not a significant
problem (Belsley, 1991).
15
In the model regressions the sample was reduced from
46 firms to 34 firms since STATA dropped 12 firms due to
their having no variance in the dependent variable.

16.

15.

14.

13.

11.
12.

10.

9.

8.

7.

6.

4.
5.

2.
3.

1.

Degree of
recombination (p)
Log medical sales (p-1)
Percent medical
sales (p-1)
Log firm age (p-1)
Percent turnover of
product markets (p-1)
Percent of acquired
units (p-1)
Percent increase in
total units (p-1)
Percent increase in
total sales (p-1)
Actual HQ
turnover (p-1)
Amount increase in
corp team size (p-1)
Industry munificence (p-1)
Industry
dynamism logged (p-1)
Amount dynamism
reduction (p-1)
Dummy dynamism
reduction (p-1)
Acquisition activity
in industry (p-1)
Change in rivalry
in industry (p-1)
0.2971*
0.0768

20.0705

0.1089

20.0424

20.0287

0.0176

0.0151

0.0366
0.0388

20.0510
20.0646
0.0612

0.0349

0.0417

0.0916

0.0694

0.1691*

0.1095

0.0527

20.0571
20.0713

20.0507

0.2655*

20.0206

20.1308

0.1202

20.2620*
0.0644

1.0000
20.1167

4

20.2166*
20.0884

1.0000

3

20.0439

20.0180

0.1627*

0.1792*

0.0773
0.0235

20.1713*

0.4942*

0.1004

20.0543

0.6441*

20.0605

0.2936*

0.5325*
20.0451

1.0000
20.0908

2

0.0626

0.2636*

0.2604*
0.0331

0.4758*
20.0420

1.0000

1

0.0054

20.1588*

0.0730

20.0453

20.0951

20.0044

20.0660

20.1128

20.0720
0.0381

0.0807

0.1923*

20.0043

0.2618*

1.0000

6

0.1154
0.0052

0.0814

20.0388

0.1989*

0.4928*

0.2153*

1.0000

5

20.0939

20.1957*

20.2155*

20.1968*

20.0861
0.0955

0.1026

20.0134

0.0642

1.0000

7

0.0505

20.0140

20.0209

20.0141

0.0463
20.0526

0.0077

20.0657

1.0000

8

0.0117

0.0984

0.1354

0.0743

20.0532
0.0571

20.2766*

1.0000

9

TABLE 3
Pearson Pairwise Correlation Matrix (* p < .05)

20.0106

20.0916

20.0483

20.0205

20.0197
0.0407

1.0000

10

0.1373

0.0580

0.4419*

0.6390*

1.0000
20.5075*

11

20.6054*

20.4780*

20.5680*

20.6006*

1.0000

12

0.1004

0.2303*

0.7015*

1.0000

13

0.3033*

0.5548*

1.0000

14

0.7027*

1.0000

15

1.0000

16

2016
Karim, Carroll, and Long
805

yes

yes
132
34
62.38
0.000

2.048*** (0.527)
0.021 (0.296)
20.085 (0.066)

2.048*** (0.444)
0.021 (0.148)
–0.085∼ (0.052)

132
34
84.57
0.000

0.125 (0.290)
1.256 (1.213)
23.760 (5.288)
0.044 (0.169)

0.125 (0.291)
1.256 (1.032)
23.760 (3.101)
0.044 (0.102)

robust SE

Significant estimates: ; p , 0.1, * p , 0.05, ** p , 0.01, *** p , 0.001

Number of Observations
Number of Groups
Wald chi2
Prob . chi2

Controls
Log of medical sales (p-1)
% medical sales (p-1)
Log of age (p-1)
% turnover of product
markets (p-1)
% of acquired units (p-1)
% increase in total units (p-1)
% increase in total sales (p-1)
Managerial Turbulence
Actual HQ turnover 5 Entry
and exit of corporate
executives at HQ (p-1)
Amount increase in corporate
team size (p-1)
Environmental Change
Sales munificence (growth)(p-1)
Sales dynamism logged
(turbulence)(p-1)
Panel Period Dummies

poisson

Model 1

–0.069* (0.032)

–0.069** (0.024)

131
34
90.55
0.000

131
34
156.26
0.000

yes

20.013 (0.054)

20.013 (0.050)

yes

1.851*** (0.554)
0.391 (0.460)
20.043 (0.036)

20.074 (0.487)
2.171∼ (1.315)
20.935 (4.314)
20.014 (0.186)

robust SE

1.851*** (0.462)
0.391* (0.188)
20.043 (0.040)

20.074 (0.449)
2.171* (1.114)
20.935 (3.347)
20.014 (0.103)

poisson

Model 2

131
34
119.32
0.000

131
34
220.77
0.000

Yes

6.430; (3.904)
–2.332** (0.788)

6.430* (2.825)
–2.332*** (0.621)
yes

–0.086** (0.033)

20.010 (0.068)

2.132** (0.759)
0.553; (0.314)
20.042 (0.038)

20.353 (0.496)
2.935* (1.278)
2.092 (4.393)
20.001 (0.164)

robust SE

–0.086*** (0.025)

20.010 (0.052)

2.132*** (0.482)
0.553** (0.188)
20.042 (0.043)

20.353 (0.455)
2.935** (1.120)
2.092 (3.668)
20.001 (0.106)

poisson

Model 3

TABLE 4
Relationship of Firm-level and Industry-level Turbulence(p-1) with Structural Recombination(p) Quasi maximum likelihood fixed-effects poisson
regression (without and with robust standard errors)
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external, turbulence is associated with less structural recombination. We find that the industry
dynamism estimates are negative and highly significant, and maintain significance when applying robust standard errors.
For further insight into our negative coefficient result when testing Hypothesis 2 we turn to the literature
on organization design, and specifically on restructuring. Although many papers have theoretically
linked external, industry attributes to structural
change, we found only two studies that empirically
investigated this relationship with the same explanatory variable (of industry turbulence) as in our study
(but slightly different dependent variables regarding
structure). In one paper, Bergh (1998), drawing on the
information-processing logic of contingency theory,
hypothesized that if a rationale of efficiency is attributed to restructuring, then during times of external
environmental uncertainty firms will shed unrelated
businesses and acquire related ones as it is easier to
integrate and coordinate businesses that are understood. Interestingly, he found that this logic alone
did not hold true since during times of uncertainty
firms also significantly acquired unrelated businesses,
indicating some logic of managing risk (e.g., in this case
by diversification) as an economic rationale for driving
structural change. This general idea is supported in
a study by Keats and Hitt (1988) who examined how
external environmental dimensions of instability and
complexity were linked to structural characteristics
of divisionalization and size. In a structural equation
model using data from manufacturing firms, they
found that external instability was associated with
lower levels of structural divisionalization (i.e., fewer
number of units), where divisionalization represents
decentralization and specialization in decision making. This finding implies that during times of external
industry turbulence firms are more likely to organize
into fewer, larger units—again reiterating a rationale of
managing risk (e.g., in this case by pooling activities).
We view these risk-averse behaviors as analogous to
our findings that when faced with similar environmental turbulence, firms pursue less structural realignment initiatives.
Delaying Change
Biding time for a better environment. In Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 4 we propose that firms faced with
better environmental conditions will initiate more
structural realignment. In Table 5 we test Hypothesis
3a and 3b by examining whether there is a relationship
between the amount of dynamism reduction and
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structural recombination. In Model 4 we include only
the dynamism reduction variable, and in Model 5 we
include both the level of dynamism as well as dynamism reduction, and find support for Hypothesis 3a.
Even when controlling for the level of dynamism, if
firms face a decline in dynamism from the previous
period they are more likely to have recombinations in
the current period. In Model 5 we test whether this
dynamism reduction moderates the direct negative
influence of dynamism on recombination, but the estimate is not significant. If we relax the granularity of
the measure and operationalize dynamism reduction
as a dummy variable (equaling 1 if there is a reduction
in dynamism), as in Model 7, we continue to find
support for Hypothesis 3a (as expected) and find only
weak support for Hypothesis 3b since the interaction
term is significant in the Poisson model but not when
applying robust standard errors.
Although we found support for Hypothesis 1 in
Table 4 Model 3 and observe that munificence has
a positive relationship with structural recombination, in
Table 5 we see that this significance is lost (but estimates
are still positive) once we take into consideration dynamism reduction. When both characteristics of a “better” environment are tested in a model, recombination
has a stronger significant relationship with dynamism
reduction than with industry growth. This sheds insight
into which environmental condition is more salient for
executives as they consider structural realignment. To
test Hypothesis 4, we include the interaction term of
munificence and dynamism in Table 6 Model 8 and find
only weak support (as the estimates are significant in the
regular Poisson model but lose significance when applying robust standard errors).
Comparatively, our findings indicate weaker support for Hypotheses 1 and 4—that decision makers
initiate more structural realignment when there is
more industry growth—and stronger support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b—that executives initiate realignment when the environment signals greater reductions
in turbulence.
Biding time until the environment is “really
bad.” Although our findings indicate support for the
risk-averse behavior of decision makers to pursue less
structural realignment when faced with industry turbulence, a contingency framework suggests that executives
may be biding time not just for better environmental
conditions, but for when they feel the environment is
really bad and the firm is excessively misaligned. In
other words, decision makers may have some threshold
of external turbulence, or a “tipping point,” after which
they consider initiating recombination. This salient tipping point was the basis of Miller’s (1982) “quantum

–0.101*** (0.030)
1.942 (3.978)
–1.412∼ (0.867)
11.157** (4.005)

yes

–0.100*** (0.029)
2.286 (4.240)
14.145*** (3.478)

yes

131
34
256.00
0.000

20.040 (0.064)

20.049 (0.062)

131
34
239.40
0.000

20.266 (0.484)
2.849* (1.311)
0.655 (4.185)
20.115 (0.157)
1.611** (0.616)
0.834** (0.282)
20.042 (0.038)

20.239 (0.496)
2.798* (1.311)
20.547 (4.128)
20.154 (0.147)
1.496** (0.560)
0.872*** (0.268)
20.040 (0.038)

robust SE

robust SE

Significant estimates: ; p , 0.1, *p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001

Number of Observations
Number of Groups
Wald chi2
Prob . chi2

Controls
Log of medical sales (p-1)
% medical sales (p-1)
Log of age (p-1)
% turnover of product markets (p-1)
% of acquired units (p-1)
% increase in total units (p-1)
% increase in total sales (p-1)
Managerial Turbulence
Actual HQ turnover 5 Entry and exit of
corporate executives at HQ (p-1)
Amount increase in corporate team size (p-1)
Environmental Change
Sales munificence (growth)(p-1)
Sales dynamism logged (turbulence)(p-1)
Amount dynamism reduction (p-1)
Interaction: Sales dynamism *
Amount dynamism reduction
Dummy dynamism reduction (p-1)
Interaction: Sales dynamism *
Dummy dynamism reduction
Panel Period Dummies

Model 5

Model 4

131
34
257.91
0.000

yes

2.711 (4.780)
21.525 (1.013)
2.906 (21.394)
24.678 (11.193)

–0.105*** (0.033)

20.040 (0.062)

20.308 (0.494)
3.034* (1.449)
0.847 (4.114)
20.111 (0.160)
1.558** (0.596)
0.843** (0.280)
20.040 (0.037)

robust SE

Model 6

131
34
121.71
0.000

yes

4.141* (1.712)
2.336* (0.976)

4.974 (3.190)
–3.155*** (0.793)

–0.078** (0.025)

20.021 (0.053)

20.113 (0.464)
2.706* (1.117)
1.640 (3.622)
20.003 (0.107)
2.141*** (0.485)
0.601** (0.189)
20.057 (0.047)

poisson

yes

4.141∼ (2.279)
2.336 (1.491)

4.974 (4.001)
–3.155** (1.091)

–0.078* (0.034)

20.021 (0.076)

20.113 (0.524)
2.706* (1.323)
1.640 (4.368)
20.003 (0.162)
2.141** (0.783)
0.601* (0.308)
20.057 (0.039)

robust SE

131
34
173.64
0.000

Model 7

TABLE 5
Relationship of Firm-level and Industry-level Turbulence(p-1) with Structural Recombination(p) Quasi maximum likelihood fixed-effects poisson
regression (without or with robust standard errors)
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TABLE 6
Relationship of Firm-level and Industry-level Turbulence(p-1) with Structural Recombination(p) Quasi maximum likelihood
fixed-effects poisson regression (without or with robust standard errors)
Model 8

Controls
Log of medical sales (p-1)
% medical sales (p-1)
Log of age (p-1)
% turnover of product markets (p-1)
% of acquired units (p-1)
% increase in total units (p-1)
% increase in total sales (p-1)
Managerial Turbulence
Actual HQ turnover 5 Entry and
exit of corporate executives at HQ (p-1)
Amount increase in corporate
team size (p-1)
Environmental Change
Sales munificence (growth)(p-1)
Sales dynamism logged (turbulence)(p-1)
Interaction: Sales dynamism *
Sales munificence
Acquisition activity in industry (p-1)
Change in rivalry in industry (p-1)
Panel Period Dummies
Number of Observations
Number of Groups
Wald chi2
Prob . chi2

Model 9

Model 10

poisson

robust SE

robust SE

robust SE

20.326 (0.465)
2.649* (1.135)
2.378 (3.686)
20.028 (0.107)
2.055*** (0.480)
0.652*** (0.195)
20.041 (0.043)

20.326 (0.504)
2.649* (1.321)
2.378 (4.481)
20.028 (0.164)
2.055** (0.748)
0.652* (0.324)
20.041 (0.037)

20.479 (0.590)
4.162** (1.362)
0.589 (5.560)
0.001 (0.159)
2.194*** (0.608)
0.604** (0.239)
20.063 (0.043)

20.173 (0.553)
3.389** (1.239)
20.442 (4.218)
20.133 (0.154)
1.774** (0.637)
0.849*** (0.258)
20.055 (0.039)

20.016 (0.053)

20.016 (0.075)

20.023 (0.058)

20.010 (0.057)

–0.085*** (0.025)

–0.085* (0.035)

–0.092*** (0.029)

–0.106*** (0.029)

20.484** (7.853)
–3.577*** (0.911)
11.837* (5.939)

20.484 (12.756)
–3.577*** (0.998)
11.837 (8.437)

5.884 (4.295)
–1.872* (0.951)

5.393 (4.086)
–2.405** (0.849)

–0.020*** (0.005)
yes
131
34
119.41
0.000

yes
131
34
185.30
0.000

–0.009*** (0.003)

yes
131
34
203.14
0.000

131
34
244.13
0.000

Significant estimates: ; p , 0.1, * p , 0.05, ** p , 0.01, *** p , 0.001

view of structural change”. In his view, Miller proposed
that because incremental, frequent structural change is
costly, firms should pursue “quantum or revolutionary”
structural change only after “a critical state of incongruence with the environment is reached” (p. 133).
This view complements contingency theory’s expectation that firms may choose to tolerate some degree of
external turbulence until enough evidence of a misfit
accumulates to produce a perceived state of nonequilibrium significant enough to motivate firms to
pursue structural change (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994).
We explored this second rationale for biding time—
waiting until a “critical state of incongruence”—by
testing both a U-shape quadratic relationship between
industry-level dynamism and structural recombination,
as well as a split-sample analysis of low and high dynamism groups. The results are shown in Table 7.
Model 11 includes a quadratic term, but we do not find
support for a U-shape relationship in which the negative
effect of turbulence on recombination is followed by
a positive effect. The coefficient on the square term is
negative and insignificant. The split-sample analysis in

Models 12 and 13 sheds some light on our analysis;
these models split the sample around the median level
of industry turbulence. We find that in cases of lower
dynamism the effect of dynamism on recombination is
negative and significant, and for cases of higher dynamism the effect is still negative and significant but less
negative. Thus, decision makers may be more prone
(i.e., less negative) to initiate structural recombination in
the case of higher dynamism as compared to lower
dynamism, but overall the influence is still negative; this
indicates that the relationship observed is somewhat
comparable to the left-side of a U-shape relationship
where the steepness of the negative effect declines from
lower to higher dynamism,16 but we do not find the right
16

Note that we do not find evidence of a quadratic relationship between turbulence and recombination, so
our findings of the split-sample results indicate more of
a tilted-step function. On the “left side” of the graph with
lower dynamism there is a steep negative slope. On the
“right side” of the graph when there is higher dynamism
the slope is less steep but still negative. We never see a tilt
upwards with a positive slope.
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side of the U-shape with a positive effect that would
indicate a tipping-point.
Together, the prior studies’ showing risk-averse
behaviors of executives (Bergh, 1998; Keats & Hitt,
1988) as well as our finding a lack of a tippingpoint indicate that decision makers seem to be
biding time for environmental conditions to improve before they pursue structural realignment.
These findings give us greater confidence that
our negative coefficient estimate on the influence
of external turbulence on recombination is indicative of behavioral choices made by executives,
not inertial constraints. Recall, also, that in our
models we control for inertia through firm size (as
sales) and age. Thus, our findings suggest that it
is not so much that decision makers are unable
to structurally change as it may be that they are
delayed by the environment and choose to wait for
better conditions.
Robustness checks. To further test the robustness of our results that indicate a negative direct
influence of turbulence on recombination, we
examined several other indicators of industry
turbulence.17 First, we captured the level of “acquisition activity” in the industries studied as an
indicator of consolidation and gathered data from
the Securities Data Company (SDC) database on
the industries in our sample for the number of
acquisitions that took place during our study period. Second, we captured the level of competition
(i.e., rivalry) in industries by gathering data from
Compustat for the number of public firms that existed during the periods in our study; as another form
of industry turbulence, we added “change in rivalry”
to our model. Building on the model specifications of
Model 3, our results are shown in Table 6 in Model 9
and Model 10. Both of these additional industry
turbulence measures are highly significant and have
a negative relationship with structural change, reinforcing our confidence in our original (commonly
used) industry sales dynamism measure.
17

Recall that our operationalization of external industry
turbulence is based on a dynamism measure of industry
sales (Dess & Beard, 1984; Garg et al., 2003; Nadkarni &
Barr, 2008; Sutcliffe, 1994). As a robustness check, we also
operationalized dynamism based on industry operating
income and industry net income; these data were also
gathered from Compustat for our 28 4-digit NAICS segments and a weighted dynamism measure was calculated
for each firm in each panel depending on which markets it
was active in. Our results were robust; coefficient estimates
were still negative and significant.
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Managerial Conditions and Structural
Realignment
We now turn our attention to turbulence among
decision makers. Hypotheses 5a and 5b expect that
turbulence in management in the form of executive
turnover at corporate headquarters and growth in the
TMT may hinder structural realignment due to their
inability to process information and build consensus
around structural recombination decisions. Although
the coefficient estimates are negative, our analysis
finds that the turnover of corporate executives does
not significantly affect recombination, thus there is no
support for Hypothesis 5a. We do find, however, that
change in the corporate team size does have a significant and negative relationship with structural recombination, giving support to Hypothesis 5b.
Interestingly, when doing robustness checks of simple magnitudes, we find that team size itself (not
change in team size) is not significant.18 Thus, it is not
simply the size of a team (i.e., a larger team) that deters
recombination, but the increase in the size of the team
from the prior period. Let’s imagine four scenarios for
a firm. In Scenario A, the firm grew from having four
corporate executives to eight, thus the change in corporate team size is the addition of four executives. In
Scenario B, the firm grew from having a TMT of six to
eight, changing the corporate team size by two executives. In both scenarios A and B, the corporate team
size is ultimately eight. Now consider Scenario C in
which the firm’s corporate team size grew from ten to
14 executives, a change of four. In Scenario D the firm
grew from a TMT of 12 to 14, a change of two. In both
scenarios C and D the corporate team size is 14. Regardless of whether the firm has a TMT size of eight
versus 14, according to our findings this will not have
a significant impact on the degree of structural recombination in the next period. However, both scenarios A and C are examples in which the firm had
a change in team size of four executives, and both scenarios B and D are examples of situations where firms
had a change in team size of two executives. Based on
our analysis in Table 4, if the firm experienced a scenario
like A or C (i.e., as compared to scenarios B or D), this will
have a significant and negative impact on the number of
business unit recombinations in the next period. These
18

To fully understand the relationship between our
constructs, we also conducted regression analyses for the
magnitude measures of our variables. We show in the paper only the tables with turbulence measures (i.e., relative
change in our variables) for the sake of brevity. These additional models of magnitude are available upon request.

–0.079* (0.034)

4.365 (3.784)
26.886 (5.898)
21.436 (1.846)
yes

–0.079** (0.026)

4.365 (3.558)
26.886 (4.659)
21.436 (1.450)
yes
131
34
119.75
0.000

Number of Observations
Number of Groups
Wald chi2
Prob . chi2

Significant estimates: ; p , 0.1, * p , 0.05, ** p , 0.01, *** p , 0.001

20.003 (0.070)

20.003 (0.053)

131
34
235.72
0.000

20.330 (0.495)
2.981* (1.294)
1.766 (4.285)
20.010 (0.162)
2.138** (0.808)
0.567∼ (0.309)
20.045 (0.037)

20.330 (0.458)
2.981** (1.116)
1.766 (3.640)
20.010 (0.106)
2.138*** (0.484)
0.567** (0.187)
20.045 (0.045)

robust SE

Controls
Log of medical sales (p-1)
% medical sales (p-1)
Log of age (p-1)
% turnover of product markets (p-1)
% of acquired units (p-1)
% increase in total units (p-1)
% increase in total sales (p-1)
Managerial Turbulence
Actual HQ turnover 5 Entry and
exit of corporate executives
at HQ (p-1)
Amount increase in corporate
team size(p-1)
Environmental Change
Sales munificence (growth)(p-1)
Sales dynamism logged (turbulence)(p-1)
Square (Sales dynamism logged)
Panel Period Dummies

poisson

Model 11

45
19
29.04
0.010

yes

9.175 (41.013)
–18.370* (9.273)

0.056 (0.429)

20.653 (0.665)

1.116 (2.164)
27.611*** (7.719)
94.392*** (27.324)
20.192 (0.966)
9.847* (4.148)
1.447* (0.661)
–5.236** (1.717)

Sample With Lower
Dynamism
poisson

Model 12

48
19
60.01
0.000

yes

11.777∼ (6.436)
–2.939∼ (1.544)

–0.124* (0.059)

0.083 (0.085)

3.205∼ (1.795)
1.168 (4.709)
–54.658* (21.914)
20.100 (0.270)
6.303* (2.686)
20.078 (0.616)
0.620∼ (0.343)

poisson

48
19
530.21
0.000

yes

11.777* (5.281)
–2.939** (1.102)

20.124 (0.081)

0.083 (0.138)

3.205∼ (1.947)
1.168 (4.897)
–54.658*** (16.984)
20.100 (0.353)
6.303*** (1.495)
20.078 (0.459)
0.620 (0.493)

robust SE

Sample With Higher Dynamism

Model 13

TABLE 7
Relationship of Firm-level and Industry-level Turbulence(p-1) with Structural Recombination(p) Quasi maximum likelihood fixed-effects poisson
regression (without or with robust standard errors)
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results have potential implications to decision
making in the TMT; the greater the addition of executives to the team, the more difficult it may be for
them to reach consensus or form a dominant logic
around structural realignment decisions (Cyert &
March, 1963, Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Inversely,
the greater the deletion of executives from the corporate team, the easier it may be for the team to
reach a consensus that supports structural change.
When examining our controls, note that we control for turbulence in firms’ other core elements,
namely market strategies, work coordination, and
performance (Nadler & Tushman, 1997; Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985). Of these controls, we find a significant influence of turbulence from increased acquisition activity within the firm to be positively
related to structural realignment. This is consistent
with prior work on acquisitions and recombination
(Karim, 2006; Puranam, Singh, & Chaudhuri, 2009),
and structural change in general (Capron, Dussauge,
& Mitchell, 1998; Capron & Mitchell, 1998; Johnson,
1996). We also find a positive relationship between
percent increase in number of total units (i.e., a sign of
greater divisionalization of work) and recombination.
This is consistent with research that has shown that
firms may recombine structures to form fewer, larger
units to enable better coordination or consolidation
(Argyres, 1996; Johnson, 1996). In our models, although the coefficient estimates for “percent increase
in total sales” are negative, they are not significant. Of
our panel period dummies, only the period 1986–1989
had significantly more recombination activity compared to the period 1993–1997 across firms in our
sample.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to build upon contingency theory and organization design literatures to
better understand when and how decision makers
pursue structural realignment to regain fit with
changing environments. We drew on decisionmaking and group dynamics theories to inform our
understanding of more nuanced contingencies that
may drive or hinder structural change.
Though a general prescription of contingency
theory may be to realign structure when there is industry growth, we hypothesized that external environmental change in the form of industry turbulence
may deter alignment (i.e., until other opportune
conditions arise) for several reasons. Specifically, we
argued that during industry turbulence, the inability
of decision makers to collect or process information
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related to how to realign their structures will lead
them to delay or avoid making these decisions. Their
tendencies to do this may be exacerbated by predictions that any benefits from recombination will
be unattainable or will at least be less than what can
be obtained by maintaining the status quo. This
negative relationship between industry turbulence
and structural recombination abates under better
environmental conditions of industry growth and
declining turbulence, where decision makers are
able to develop decision strategies and more effectively evaluate the benefits of structural alignments
through recombination.
We also explored whether it was only better external environments that would trigger structural
change, or whether it could be that firms were
waiting for a critical state of misfit before pursuing
recombination. We did not find evidence of this
tipping-point but did find evidence of a less negative effect for higher versus lower levels of industry
turbulence, resembling something comparable to
the left-side of a U-shape relationship that is not
smooth (i.e., a really steep negative slope, followed
by a less steep negative slope). This finding further
supports our contention that decision makers will
delay attempting to structurally realign their organizations within turbulent external environments,
and instead bide their time for better environmental
conditions.
Our second focus was to draw attention to how
internal turbulence among TMTs can also hinder
decision making and structural realignment initiatives. When examining how management turbulence
may impact structural realignment, we did not find
a significant influence of executive turnover but did
find that growth in TMT size is associated with less
structural recombination. We attribute this negative
effect to difficulties in evaluating data that hinders
the capacities of TMTs to reach agreements on key
issues. This finding informs organizational design
theory in that not only size and diversity may impede
TMT choices about organizational forms, but also
that increases in the TMT size may lead to decisionmaking delays about changes in a firm’s organizational structures.
Our study has several managerial implications.
Given that we found an inclination for firms to bide
time for better industry conditions (than excessively
bad levels of turbulence) before initiating structural
realignment, decision makers need to judge what
industry conditions are considered favorable to
them. Also, we did find a lessening negative influence for the firms facing greater versus lesser
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industry turbulence; though we did not find a tippingpoint, firms may have changing external conditions
(e.g., new regulatory oversight or rules) that do create
an upswing in recombination. Executives should be
aware of other factors in their environments that may
emerge to trigger critical misfit and structural realignment. Finally, firms should be cognizant of not
changing the team size radically from one period to
the next so as not to exacerbate difficulties in processing information and potential delays in forming
decision consensuses.
There are certainly limitations to our investigation and many potential extensions. A limitation to
this study is that we do not explore the performance
implications of structural realignment through recombination; do those firms that defy the norm and
tackle the potential disruption of structural change
even under “bad” environmental conditions perform better or worse than those that do not attempt
it? It would also be interesting to examine what
capabilities firms possess that make unit recombination successful and to explore if and how these
capabilities are established. We observed that
changes in team size has a relationship with structural change; it would also be particularly interesting to explore in greater detail the composition of
such teams and the executives’ histories to see
whether these make a difference in how teams reach
consensus. Our sample size was limited to 46 firms
in two medical sectors (pharmaceuticals and
medical devices) due to the demands of intricate
mapping of structural change over a 20-year period.
Other sectors may reveal different patterns of organizational responses to turbulence; Hrebeniak and
Snow (1980) did find that organizational responses
to environmental uncertainty vary by industry.
Undoubtedly, we will gain a better understanding
of the generalizability of our findings if additional
sectors are studied.
Our goal was to examine how firms react to
environmental turbulence through structural
realignment, specifically recombination. To our
knowledge, there has not been an empirical
analysis at this level of granularity on changing
business unit boundaries, nor one that also considers the factors that may hinder decision makers in
the process of realignment. By studying how both
external industry forces and TMT changes within
the firm impact decision makers’ capacities to process information and form consensuses, we have
aimed at providing organization design scholars
with greater insights into factors that influence
structural change.
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